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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through 
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER, 
an individual, and JAMES 
BOUCHER, an individual, 
Appellants, 
Case No- 900476 
vs. Priority No. 16 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba DIXIE 
MEDICAL CENTER, EDWARD FOXLEY, 
M.D., DAVID MOORE, M.D., KATHY 
MARSHALL, R.N., and DOES 1 
through 20, inclusive, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM A RULE 54(b) FINAL ORDER OF THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether this Court will assume the correctness of the 
lower court's judgment where, as here, Appellants fail to cite the 
record to support their contentions on appeal? 
II. Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellants' 
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress pursuant to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 and current Utah authorities, 
which uniformly apply a zone-of-danger standard of recovery? 
1 
III. Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellants' 
claim for loss of filial consortium in connection with a nonfatal 
injury because no such claim is recognized under Utah law? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
The determinative statutes and Rules are: (1) Utah Code Ann, 
§§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953, as amended); (2) Utah Const, art. XVI, 
S 5; (3) Restatement (Second) of Torts S 313 (1965) and its 
accompanying comments, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum "A"; and (4) Rule 24(a)(6), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure; 
The determinative case authorities are: (1) Trees v. Lewis, 
738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); (2) Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1988); (3) Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 
791 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); (4) White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 
1315, 1318 (Utah App. 1990); (5) Hackford v. Utah Power & Light 
Company, 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987); and Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 
209 (111. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case: 
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of alleged 
negligence in the treatment and care of Daniel Boucher, in which 
Daniel's parents, James and Torla Boucher assert claims to recover 
for (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) loss 
of filial consortium. 
2 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition By The 
District Court: 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Appellants") filed a complaint 
alleging medical malpractice against the defendants-Respondents 
(Respondents) in the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County 
on October 25, 1989. (Record (R.) at 5-16.) Respondents moved 
for change of venue. Their motions were granted on January 29, 
1990, and the case was transferred to the Fifth Judicial District 
for Washington County. 
2. Respondent David Moore answered the Complaint. (R. at 
17-25.) However, Respondents Dixie Medical Center, a division of 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., David Foxley, M.D., and Kathryn Marshall, R.N. 
(Hospital Respondents), in response to the Complaint, filed a 
Motion to Dismiss on December 7, 1989, and requested that the 
Appellants' second and third causes of action be dismissed. (R. 
81-82.J1 
3. Respondent David Moore filed a motion to dismiss on the 
identical grounds as the Hospital Respondents on March 5, 1990. 
(R. 180-183.) 
4. Judge J. Philip Eves considered the motions, briefs and 
oral argument of the parties and entered his Order on May 23, 1990, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "B," dismissing 
Appellants' second cause of action holding that the allegations of 
xThe basis of this motion was that the second cause of action 
(1) sought damages for Torla Boucher and James Boucher's loss of 
consortium with their son, Daniel Boucher, and (2) claimed damages 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and damages incurred 
by Torla and James Boucher in viewing their quadriplegic son. The 
third cause of action sought hedonic damages. (R. at 5-16.) 
3 
James and Torla Boucher for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and loss of consortium with their child failed to state 
any claim. (R. 302-304.)2 
5. Appellants filed their notice of appeal from the May 23, 
1990 interlocutory order on June 18, 1990. (R. 305-306). The 
Supreme Court noted the filing on June 25, 1990 (R. 307) and 
assigned Appellate Court No. 900299. The appeal was later 
dismissed and remitted to the Fifth Judicial District Court on 
August 27, 1990, for the reason the appeal was not taken from a 
final judgment. (R. 318.) 
6. On September 26, 1990, the trial court certified the 
order of dismissal for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is attached as Addendum 
"C." (R. 332-334.) Appellants filed a second notice of appeal on 
October 1, 1990. (R. 341-342.) 
C. Statement of Facts: 
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellants' Brief goes 
beyond the? Record and reasonable inferences which might be made 
therefrom. Therefore, Respondents offer the following facts to 
accurately present and clarify the Record. 
2The judge also dismissed the third cause of action for 
hedonic damages because it was encompassed by Appellants' first 
cause of action. The portion of the order dismissing the third 
cause of action is not a subject of this appeal, having been 
conceded by Appellants. 
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1. Late in the evening on June 1, 1987, Appellant Daniel 
Boucher ("Daniel11), 18 years old and not a minor,3 was throwing 
homemade bombs made of Co2 cartridges from the Man-of-War Bridge 
near St. George, Utah. One of the bombs exploded prematurely, 
seriously damaging Daniel's right hand. He was taken to Dixie 
Medical Center and Dr. David Moore performed surgery on the hand 
on June 2, 1987. (R. at 5-10.) See Addendum "D." 
2. Appellants claim that sometime during the early morning 
of June 3, 1987, Daniel suffered an event, involving respiratory 
difficulties, which resulted in loss of consciousness. When he 
awoke, he was in a quadriplegic state. (R. at 5-16.) 
3. Daniel's parents ("Torla and James Boucher") assert that 
they are entitled to recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress arising out of the alleged negligence in care and 
treatment rendered on behalf of a third person, their son. (R. at 
5-16, Plaintiff's Complaint at Ml 24-25.) 
4. James and Torla also claim that they are entitled to 
recover for alleged loss of filial consortium as a separate claim 
and component of damage due to the nonfatal injury to their son. 
(R. at 5-16 and Plaintiffs' Complaint at flfl 26-27, attached hereto 
as Addendum "E.") 
5. It is undisputed that James and Torla Boucher did not 
observe the incident involving respiratory difficulties or other 
injury causing event to Daniel Boucher at the time he experienced 
3Medical records indicate his date of birth is June 11, 1968. 
See Addendum "»". See, also, Appellants' Brief, Statement of 
Facts, at p. i. 
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them at approximately 4:30 a.m. on June 3, 1987. It is also 
undisputed that James and Torla Boucher were not patients of 
Respondents or in any other way threatened with emotional distress 
from medical treatment that was by its very nature directed at 
them. (R. at 69-80.) 
6. Likewise, it is undisputed that James and Torla Boucher 
were not threatened with emotional distress likely to result in 
bodily harm because of fright, shock or other emotional disturbance 
arising out of fear for their own safety or invasion of their own 
similar interests. (R. at 71-73.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The focus of Respondents' Argument is upon Appellants1 failure 
to state any recognized theory of recovery for either negligent 
infliction of emotional distress or loss of filial consortium in 
connection with a nonfatal injury under the facts of this case and 
pursuant to applicable Utah laws. 
In addition, however, significant procedural defects also 
independently justify affirmance of the judgment of dismissal in 
favor of Respondents as a matter of law. Appellants have 
completely failed to cite the Record on Appeal and thus, this Court 
should assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
The claim of Torla and James Boucher for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress fails as a matter of law. Appellants 
completely ignore the zone-of-danger rule adopted by this Court as 
the standard for recovery of damages. Accordingly, Appellants' 
arguments on appeal are inapplicable in Utah. Moreover, even under 
6 
the more liberal standards of recovery, now clarified by recent 
California Supreme Court decisions, no recovery may be had for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. First, Appellants were 
never in any zone-of-danger created by allegedly negligent medical 
treatment. Second, James and Torla Boucher were not present at the 
scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurred and 
were not then aware that it was causing injury to their son Daniel. 
Under these circumstances, there can be no recovery for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress under any theory advanced by 
Appellants. 
For several reasons, neither can there be recovery for loss 
of filial consortium in the instant case. First, Daniel Boucher 
is not a minor and Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) has 
no application to his parents. Second, the provisions relating to 
wrongful death, including Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953, as 
amended) and Utah Const, art. XVI, Sec. 5, both deal with the death 
of an individual and have no application to the claims of 
Appellants. Finally, a cause of action for loss of filial 
consortium is fraught with numerous difficulties, including (1) the 
absence of the right to recover damages for loss of spousal or 
parental consortium in the case of nonfatal injuries; (2) the 
invasion of the legislature's prerogative; (3) unnecessary and 
burdensome expansion of relief to tangential relatives; and (4) 
confusion of the trier of fact on issues of damages. 
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For these reasons, the order dismissing plaintiffs' claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of filial 
consortium should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE APPELLANTS FAILED 
TO REFER TO ANY PORTION OF THE RECORD THAT 
FACTUALLY SUPPORTS THEIR CONTENTIONS ON 
APPEAL. 
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the 
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, Appellants do 
not support facts set forth in their Brief with citations to the 
Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); and State 
v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982). For example, in State 
v. Tucker, this Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to 
any portion of the Record that factually supports his 
contention on appeal. 
In the instant case, Appellants offer absolutely no factual 
support for their contention that the lower court improperly 
entered judgment against Appellants on the issues of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and filial consortium. Rather, 
Appellants1 cited authorities and the accompanying fact statement 
clearly demonstrate that the judgments of the lower court were in 
keeping with the laws governing negligent infliction of emotional 
distress in Utah and the lack of a cause of action for filial 
consortium. 
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Appellants also mistakenly assume that deficiencies in their 
pleadings and/or arguments before the trial court can be remedied 
at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, at page 16 of their 
Brief, Appellants "request that the [Supreme] Court grant leave to 
amend the complaint to more properly and fully state the 
allegations of the direct-victim liability." This contention and 
request is not only improperly raised before this Court, but may 
not be considered on appeal. 
This Court has forcefully and consistently held that it will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Sorenson 
v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 at n.l (Utah 1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739 
P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Inslev Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). In summary, 
Bouchers have demonstrated their intention to abandon any pending 
efforts to modify their claims before the trial court by pursuing 
this appeal without first securing a ruling from the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE CLAIM OF TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER FOR 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A. Utah Has Adopted the Zone-Of-Danger Rule As Its Standard 
For Recovery For Negligent Infliction Of Emotional 
Distress. 
In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), this Court 
recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.4 However, it was careful to select a standard of 
4
 Previously, in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) 
and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the Utah 
(continued...) 
9 
recovery that would effectively balance the needs of tort victims 
in seeking redress for legitimate injuries, while providing a 
reasonable and predictable limit on recovery. Contrary to 
Appellants' mistaken reliance on a broad "survey of the law of 
other states," which could be satisfied by the specific facts of 
the Johnson decision, it is the Concurring Opinion of Justice 
Zimmerman, which states the majority view and determinative test 
for liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.5 
This Court's opinions firmly state, without equivocation, that 
Utah's test for imposition of liability for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress is contained in the "zone-of-danger" standard 
set forth in Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965), as explained in the Comments accompanying that section. 
4(...continued) 
Supreme Court had rejected, without analysis, a claim for emotional 
distress to the parents of a child damaged by allegedly negligent 
medical treatment: " [I]t is well established in Utah that a cause 
of action for emotional distress may not be based upon mere 
negligence." 
5
 Justice Zimmerman declared that: 
"I agree that this cause of action does exist in Utah, 
as the trial court held. However, I depart from Justice 
Durham with regard to the legal standard by which such 
a cause of action is to be defined in Utah. Her opinion 
surveys the law of other states--a helpful exercise-
but it declines to choose from among the various possible 
rules because all seem satisfied in this case. If we 
were to do no more, courts and counsel would be left 
entirely without satisfactory guidance in dealing with 
all cases but the present one. 
Justices Hall, Howe and Stewart concurred in the opinion of Justice 
Zimmerman. Johnson, 763 P.2d at 785. 
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Johnson, 763 P.2d at 785. Pertinent portions of Section 313 
provide as follows: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional 
distress to another, he is subject to liability to the 
other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved 
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, 
otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of 
a third person and 
(b) from facts known to him should have 
realized that the distress, if it were caused, 
might result in illness or bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application 
to illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by 
emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to 
a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has 
otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
the other. (emphasis added). 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965). 
Since its acknowledgement of a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, this Court has consistently 
applied the Restatement "zone-of-danger" rule as the standard for 
recovery. See Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 
P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); and White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 
1315, 1318 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Dalley, a patient brought a medical malpractice action 
against her physician, among others, for a burn injury to her leg 
which allegedly occurred while she was undergoing a caesarean 
section delivery. Part of the patient's damage claim was based 
upon a demand for recovery arising out of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and reliance upon the decision in Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). In addressing the patient's 
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claim, this Court noted that Dallev was distinguished from Johnson 
for the reason that the plaintiff in Dallev "did not witness the 
injury itself." Dallev, 791 P.2d at 201. This Court, relying on 
the "zone-of-danger" standard of recovery, further held that: 
ff[A]wards for negligently inflicted distress arise when physical 
or mental illness results from the emotional trauma itself." Id. 
In White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Court of Appeals explained that: 
[T]he Utah Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 
771, 782 (Utah 1988), recognized that such an action may 
be maintained, but the main opinion did not articulate 
clear-cut guidelines for recovery. Justice Zimmerman, 
in a concurring opinion joined by the other justices, 
thus forming a majority of the court, set forth the 
standards enunciated in section 313 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965) as the test for determining 
liability for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 785 
Appellants completely ignore this accepted Utah rule of law, 
apparently conceding the fact that they cannot recover thereunder, 
based upon the circumstances of this case. In addition, Appellants 
not only misapprehend the appropriate standard of recovery, but 
also improperly suggest that the Johnson decision is "premised" 
upon "California Supreme Court decisions," which Appellants 
mistakenly contend allow them recovery "either as direct victims, 
and/or as bystander victims." (Appellants1 Brief at p. 10.) These 
contentions emphasize Appellants1 misunderstanding of the newly 
recognized cause of action and the decisions governing its 
application in Utah. 
First, the Johnson decision, as it relates to the majority 
rule governing negligent infliction of emotional distress, was not 
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premised on any California Supreme Court case. Johnson, 763 P.2d 
at 785. Second, Utah decisions relative to the issue of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress clearly rely on the Restatement 
zone-of-danger rule of recovery, which Appellants choose to ignore. 
Finally, both Justice Durham's opinion and that of Justice 
Zimmerman agree that there can be no recovery by bystanders under 
the Utah "zone-of-danger" rule. In summary, Appellants fail to 
address the applicable rule of law in Utah and further fail to 
justify the application of any other expanded theories of recovery. 
B. The Claims Of Torla And James Boucher Are Insufficient 
To Satisfy The Utah Zone-Of-Danqer Standard Of Recovery. 
It is clear that the claim of Torla and James Boucher for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress relates solely to 
alleged negligence with respect to care and treatment of their son, 
Daniel Boucher or, in other words, alleged potential for harm and 
peril to a third person. In the instant case, Torla and James 
Boucher were simply not within their son's "zone of danger." 
Indeed, to be within the zone of danger, the Bouchers would have 
had to be subject to the same allegedly negligent medical treatment 
which they contend caused injury to their son. Johnson, 763 P.2d 
at 785. No such facts are present in the instant case. 
It is likewise undisputed that no conduct of the defendants 
threatened either Torla or James Boucher with bodily harm, fright, 
shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out of fear for 
their own safety or the invasion of their own similar interests, 
except because of the alleged peril to their son. Under these 
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circumstances, Mr. and Mrs. Boucher have no right of recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress because: (1) the 
defendant's alleged medical negligence was not, by its very nature, 
directed at Mr. and Mrs Boucher; (2) Torla and James Boucher were, 
at best, bystanders and not direct victims in this case for the 
reason that they were not even in the hospital at the time Daniel 
suffered the alleged injury causing event; and (3) the alleged 
invasion of the Bouchers' interests is vicarious and only arises 
because of alleged peril to a third person, their son. 
Finally, bystander and other expanded theories of recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress are inapplicable under 
Utah law. In Johnson, the opinion of Justice Durham reviews the 
various standards of liability, all of which seemed to allow 
recovery under the specific facts in Johnson. The opinion of 
Justice Durham then observes the following limitations inherent in 
the "zone-of-danger" rule which was adopted by this Court: 
States [such as Utah] that have adopted a zone-of-danger 
rule have, in effect, limited recovery to cases involving 
direct victims, disallowing recovery to bystanders. 
Plaintiffs who are allowed to recover because they were 
present within the zone-of-danger are direct victims 
because the defendant breached the duty of care owed 
them. Other witnesses falling outside of the zone are 
denied recovery due to the lack of direct injury and 
breach of a duty. (Emphasis added). 
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 781-82. The notes accompanying Section 313 
are helpful in defining the zone of danger by distinguishing 
between bystanders and direct victims. 
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Comment (d) to Section 313 articulates some differences 
between bystander and direct victim liability: 
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where the 
negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with 
emotional distress likely to result in bodily harm 
because of the other's fright, shock, or other emotional 
disturbance, arising out of fear for his own safety, or 
invasion of his own interests. It has no application 
where the emotional distress arises solely because of 
harm or peril to a third person, and the negligence of 
the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily 
harm in any other way. 
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a 
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate 
vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers severe 
emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other 
bodily harm to her, she cannot recover for such bodily 
harm unless she was herself in the path of the vehicle, 
or was in some other manner threatened with bodily harm 
to herself otherwise than through the emotional distress 
at the peril to her child. 6 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, James and Torla Boucher like the parent in Comment (d) 
cannot recover unless they were themselves subject to negligent 
medical treatment or threatened with bodily harm from such 
treatment other than through the emotional distress at the peril 
to their son. 
Other courts which have adopted the "zone-of-danger rule" 
consistently deny recovery to individuals, who like the Bouchers, 
are not direct victims as defined by the Restatement rule. For 
example, in Malonev v. Conrov, 545 A.2d 1059, 1062-64 (Conn. 1988), 
the court addressed the issue as to whether the daughter of a 
victim of alleged malpractice may recover for a severe emotional 
6
 These comments to Section 313 were expressly adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Johnson, at 763 P.2d at 785. 
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disturbance claimed to have resulted from observing acts of 
malpractice perpetrated on her mother. In Malonev, the court 
concluded: 
Whatever may be the situation in other contexts where 
bystander emotional disturbance claims arise, we are 
convinced that, with respect to such claims arising from 
malpractice on another person, . . . "there can be no 
recovery for nervous shock and mental anguish caused by 
the sight of injury or threatened harm to another." 
Malonev, 545 A.2d at 1063-64. 
Other decisions are instructive as to the limitations on 
liability to bystanders such as the Bouchers. For example, in 
Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial Hospital, 529 N.E.2d 1181 (111. App. 
1st Dist. 1988), the plaintiffs went to the emergency room of 
Elmhurst Memorial Hospital; the wife was in active premature labor 
at the time. While the mother was giving spontaneous birth, the 
attending physician momentarily turned away from the delivery table 
and the baby fell to the floor on her head and died in the presence 
of the mother and father. 
Under these circumstances, the Villamil court dismissed the 
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
holding that: 
Under the [zone-of-danger] rule, a bystander must be in 
the zone of physical danger to the direct victim created 
by a defendant's negligent conduct, has had a reasonable 
fear for his own safety based on a high risk to him of 
physical impact, and show physical injury or illness as 
a result of the emotional distress caused by the 
defendant's negligence. 
Villamil, 529 N.E.2d at 1182. See also Jacobs v. Horton Memorial 
Hosp., 515 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1987) (holding that there 
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was no claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by a 
wife whose husband was incorrectly informed he had pancreatic 
cancer); and Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hospital, Omaha, Neb., 480 
F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that parents were not in child's 
zone of danger in case of improper diagnosis of child.) 
This Court, in adopting the "zone-of-danger" rule, 
acknowledged that: 
[w]e cannot permit every claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress to go to a jury under such varying 
standards as each trial judge may choose. We have a 
practical obligation to articulate understandable 
standards and to impose workable limits for use in the 
Utah courts. 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988). In adopting 
Section 313, with its clear limits on recovery, this Court 
concluded that it is best to take "the more conservative approach 
and adopt the Restatement rule, as written." Id. Accordingly, 
recovery is limited to cases involving direct victims and cannot 
be extended to bystanders such as Mr. and Mrs. Boucher. The wisdom 
of this conservative approach is emphasized by the California 
Courts1 contradictory and confusing collection of cases.7 
7In criticizing the varying standards of recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the California Supreme 
Court has noted that: 
Little consideration has been given in post-Dillon 
decisions to the importance of avoiding the limitless 
exposure to liability that the pure foreseeability test 
of "duty" would create and towards which these decisions 
have moved. 
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989). 
(continued...) 
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C. The Claim Of Torla And James Boucher For Negligent 
Infliction Of Emotional Distress Fails To Satisfy Even 
More Liberal Standards Of Recovery. 
James and Torla Boucher have urged the adoption of varying 
standards of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, ranging from "direct victim" liability to contract and 
foreseeability theories of recovery. They place considerable 
reliance on several intermediate appellate court cases that predate 
the governing Supreme Court decision in Marlene F. v. Affiliated 
Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) and 
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). In making these 
arguments, Bouchers have mistakenly assumed that all of their cited 
cases and varying authorities are presently accepted standards of 
recovery from which a plaintiff may pick and choose. Bouchers 
reliance on outdated California case law is misplaced and in fact 
serves to substantiate Respondents' arguments herein when reviewed 
in the context of the most recent California Supreme Court 
authorities which, like the "zone-of-danger" rule, completely bar 
any recovery in the instant case, as set forth in detail below. 
7(...continued) 
The Thing Court also noted that "[t]he subtleties in the 
distinction between the right to recover as a 'bystander1 and as 
a 'direct victim' created what one Court of Appeal had described 
as an 'amorphous nether realm' and have contributed in some measure 
to the present difficulty in defining the scope of a [negligent 
infliction of emotional distress] action." (Citations omitted.) Id. 
at 823. 
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1. Mr. and Mrs, Boucher may not recover on either 
"direct victim" or "contract" theories of 
recovery. 
Appellants James and Torla Boucher assert that they are direct 
victims of medical malpractice because they are indirectly affected 
by alleged medical negligence as to their son. In Johnson, supra, 
this Court noted that a direct victim is a person who is actually 
within the zone of danger and against whom a duty is breached: 
Plaintiffs who are allowed to recover because they were 
present within the zone-of-danger are direct victims 
because the defendant breached the duty of care owed 
them. Other witnesses falling outside of the zone are 
denied recovery due to the lack of direct injury and 
breach of duty. 
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 781-82. In this case, the Bouchers were not 
present within their son's zone of danger, especially where there 
was no physician-patient relationship between James and Torla 
Boucher and the health care providers. 
In the most recent California decision addressing the issues 
of contract and direct victim recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress,8 the California Second District Court of 
Appeals held that where a father failed to allege the existence of 
a psychotherapist-patient relationship with the individual whom he 
had hired to treat his son, the father was neither a direct victim 
nor a beneficiary to a contract for the purpose of recovering 
emotional damages due to negligence. Schwarz v. Regents of the 
The Schwarz decision was rendered on December 13, 1990. 
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University of California, 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 
1990). 
The Schwarz Court determined that the fact "that a third party 
[individual other than the victim] thus suffers an adverse 
consequence does not mean the defendant's conduct is directed at 
the third party." Schwarz, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
With respect to the contract issue, the Court also determined 
that: 
when parents arrange for the psychotherapeutic or other 
medical treatment of their child, the "end and aim" of 
the contract is to enhance the child's health by 
ameliorating the condition requiring treatment. While 
parents assuredly have a great interest in seeing their 
child's health enhanced, their interest is not united 
with that of the child. . . . The absence of such 
closely unified interests tips the balance in favor of 
nonliability. 
id. at 480. 
The Schwarz decision is in part based upon the principles 
identified in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 
Inc. , 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). In Marlene F., three mothers 
brought their sons to the clinic to obtain counselling for family 
emotional problems. All of the sons were assigned to the same 
therapist, who began treating the mother, as well, in each case. 
The therapist believed the children's emotional difficulties arose 
partially from problems in the mother-son relationships. Later, 
the mothers learned the therapist had sexually molested each of 
their sons during counselling sessions. 
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The specific circumstances of the case were of prime 
importance to the court: 
In the present case, the complaint explicitly and 
expressly alleged that the mothers . . ., as well as the 
children, were patients of the therapist; specifically, 
that he "undertook to treat both [mother and son] for 
their intra-family difficulties by providing 
psychotherapy to both . . . ." (emphasis added). 
Marlene F., 48 Cal.3d at 590-91. In other words, the therapist's 
tortious conduct was, by its very nature, "directed at" the mother 
plaintiffs because the therapist treated the mothers directly and 
the very purpose of the therapy for both mothers and sons was to 
resolve intra-family difficulties by improving the mother-son 
relationships. Id. 
In reviewing the Marlene F. decision, the Schwarz Court 
determined that: 
The clear implication [in Marlene F.] is that the court 
would not have viewed the mothers as "direct victims" had 
the therapist treated the sons only for the purpose of 
resolving the sons1 individual emotional problems, even 
if these problems led to family difficulties, rather than 
treating the parent-child family problems themselves. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the court's subsequent 
language in stating: "It bears repeating that the mothers 
here were the patients of the therapist along with their 
sons, and the therapist's tortious conduct was 
accordingly directed at both." 
Schwarz, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. 
In summary, the Schwarz Court held that: 
treatment of an ill child is undertaken for the direct 
benefit of the child, not the parents. . . . We hold 
that when the negligence is alleged to have occurred 
during the medical treatment of the child, the 
defendant's conduct is directed solely at the child. . 
. and not at the parent who enters into the contract 
solely as a surrogate for the minor child who otherwise 
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could disaffirm it. In sum, the simple existence of a 
contract between a parent and a medical caregiver to 
provide medical treatment for a child is not in itself 
sufficient to impose on the caregiver a duty of care owed 
to the parent. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 481. 
2. The Bouchers may not recover based upon a 
foreseeabilitv theory of recovery. 
Even assuming arguendo, the expanded theories of recovery of 
California are applicable in this case, which Respondents 
strenuously deny, James and Torla Boucher still may not recover 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the facts of 
the instant case. In Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), 
the California Supreme Court concluded that limits on recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress must be imposed: 
Even if it is "foreseeable" that persons other than 
closely related percipient witnesses may suffer emotional 
distress, this fact does not justify the imposition of 
what threatens to become unlimited liability for 
emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply 
negligent. Nor does such abstract "foreseeability" 
warrant continued reliance on the assumption that the 
limits of liability will become any clearer if lower 
courts are permitted to continue approaching this issue 
on a "case-to-case" basis some 20 years after Dillon. 
Thing, 771 P.2d at 829. 
Based on its experience and distrust in the foreseeability 
standard of recovery, the California Supreme Court concluded that: 
a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress 
caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of 
a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff : (1) is 
closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at 
the scene of the injury producing event at the time it 
occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the 
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional 
distress -- a reaction beyond that which would be 
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anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not 
an abnormal response to the circumstances. (emphasis 
added). 
Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Bouchers fail 
to satisfy the second element in Thing, namely, that they must have 
been present at the scene of the injury producing event at the 
time it occurred. Thus, even under more liberal standards, there 
can be no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
in the instant case. As one court has noted: 
There is an element of ficertaxnty of injurious impact 
necessary to establish the requisite sensory perception 
of the injury-producing event. Put simply, it is the 
contemporaneous perception of the infliction of injury 
on a closely related person that causes actionable 
emotional shock to a third party bystander. Perception 
of endanqerment, while potentially stressful, is 
insufficient to cause legally cognizable harm, for the 
stress has not vet ripened into disabling shock. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital, 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. App. 
5th Dist. 1989). In summary, Appellants fail to satisfy any 
proposed standard of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Accordingly, the Judgment of Dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III 
NEITHER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953, 
AS AMENDED) NOR UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 
5 PERMIT TORLA AND JAMES BOUCHER, PARENTS OF DANIEL 
BOUCHER, TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM WITH THEIR SON 
DUE TO NONFATAL INJURIES SUFFERED BY HIM. 
Appellants, Torla and James Boucher, rely on Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah Const, art. XVI, 
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§ 5 to support their claim that they may recover for loss of 
society, companionship, and affection (filial consortium) with 
their son, Daniel Boucher, due to his nonfatal injuries. However, 
reliance on these provisions is misplaced, and no such claim or 
cause of action exists in Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah Const, 
art. XVI, § 5 pertain only to wrongful death. Accordingly, 
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-79 (1953, as amended) and Utah 
Const, art. XVI, § 510 to establish loss of filial consortium 
damages by parents is inappropriate. In addition, the cases on 
which Appellants rely, Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) 
9Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 provides: 
Except as provided in Chapter 1, of Title 35, [Workers' 
Compensation Act] when the death of a person not a minor 
is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his 
heirs, or his personal representative for the benefit of 
his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing death, or, if such person is employed by 
another person who is responsible for his conduct, then 
also against such other person. If such adult person has 
a guardian at the time of his death, only one action can 
be maintained for the injury to or death of such person 
and such action may be brought by either the personal 
representatives of such adult deceased person, for the 
benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit 
of the heirs as provided in the next preceding section 
[§ 78-11-6]. In every action under this and the next 
preceding section [§ 78-11-6] such damages may be given 
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. 
10Utah Const, art. XVI, § 5 provides: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and 
the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law. 
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and Beaman v. Martha Washington Mining Co., 63 P. 631 (Utah 
1901),both involve wrongful death. There has never been any 
dispute as to whether loss of consortium is permitted in wrongful 
death cases. However, Utah has never permitted claims for loss of 
consortium in cases involving nonfatal injuries, and plaintiffs 
have cited no authority to support their position. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, As Amended) Cannot 
Be Relied Upon By Appellants To Establish Loss Of 
Filial Consortium Because Daniel Boucher Was Not A 
Minor On The Date Of The Alleged Accident. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) provides as 
follows: 
Except as provided in Chapter 1 of Title 35, [the 
Workers' Compensation Act] a parent or guardian may 
maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor 
child when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another. Any such action may be 
maintained against the person causing injury or death, 
or if such person is employed by another person who is 
responsible for that person's conduct, also against such 
other person, (emphasis added). 
This provision only permits actions arising out of the death 
or injury of a minor child. At the time of the incident on June 
1, 1987, by plaintiffs' own admission in their appellate Brief, 
Daniel Boucher was not a minor. He was 18 years of age. Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-2-1 (1953, as amended) provides that an individual's 
majority is attained at age 18. Therefore, Appellants' claim that 
Daniel Boucher's parents are entitled to loss of filial consortium 
with their nonfatally injured son, who was not a minor at the time 
of his injury is clearly not supported by Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-
6 (1953, as amended). Moreover, it is clear that Utah does not 
recognize any action for loss of consortium where there has been 
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nonfatal injury to a spouse, a parent, or a child. In order to 
fully explain why parents may not recover for loss of consortium 
with a nonfatally injured child, whether a minor or an adult, it 
is necessary to review Utah law with regard to loss of consortium 
nonfatal injuries. 
B. Spousal Loss Of Consortium Is Not Permitted For Nonfatal 
Injuries. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1953, as amended) has been 
interpreted to mean that no cause of action for loss of consortium 
between spouses exists in the event of nonfatal injury. This 
provision provides: 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, 
maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the 
same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend all 
actions for the preservation and protection of her rights 
and property as if unmarried. There shall be no right 
of recovery by the husband on the account of personal 
injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected 
therewith, but the wife may recover against third persons 
for such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such 
recovery shall include expenses, medical treatment and 
other expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
In the case of Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Company. 740 
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987), a wife sought recovery for lost services, 
society, companionship, advice and conjugal fellowship (consortium) 
with her husband due to a serious, permanent injury suffered by 
him. This Court confirmed its prior decisions rejecting recovery 
by one spouse for nonfatal injury to the other spouse and stated: 
We adhere to our prior decisions and hold that neither 
spouse has a right to recover for loss of consortium 
under Utah law. 
Id. at 1281. 
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The Hackford case is only one of a number of cases decided 
over the years disallowing repeated attempts by a spouse to recover 
loss of spousal consortium damages when a mate is seriously 
injured. See, Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988); Gillespie 
v. Southern Utah State College, 669 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1983); Tias 
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Madison v. Deseret Livestock 
Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 
985 (Utah 1972); and Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. 
Utah 1967). Moreover, this Court has not retreated from this 
position, even though it is one of only three jurisdictions in the 
United States which does not recognize the right to recover loss 
of spousal consortium damages for nonfatal personal injuries. See 
Hackford at 1288. 
C. No Recovery Permitted By A Child For Loss Of Consortium 
With Its Parent. 
Likewise, in reviewing Utah law with regard to loss of 
consortium claims by a child for association with a parent in the 
event of nonfatal injury to the parent, the federal district court 
has declined to allow such damages. In coming to this conclusion, 
the court in Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 648 F. Supp 160, 163 (D. 
Utah 1986), announced: 
No authority has been brought to the attention of this 
court wherein the Utah Supreme Court has dealt with a 
loss of consortium by a child of an injured party. 
However, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged in oral 
argument that there is little theoretical basis for 
distinguishing between claims for consortium by a spouse 
and a child. Accordingly, the Ellis case appears to bar 
such claims by Justine Wollam, the child of the injured 
party. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted and plaintiff's second and third claims for 
relief are hereby dismissed. 
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D. No Recovery Permitted For Loss Of Filial Consortium. 
It having been determined that Utah law does not permit an 
action by a spouse for loss of consortium damages resulting from 
nonfatal injury to his or her mate, or by a child for a nonfatally 
injured parent, the same conclusion should be reached with regard 
to a claim for loss of consortium by a parent with an injured 
child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) states that a 
parent may maintain an action on behalf of a minor child. However, 
even if Daniel Boucher had been a minor child, this provision 
cannot support an action for loss of filial consortium. It is 
confined to allowing a parent to recover the value of lost services 
and medical expense expended in behalf of the child. (It may also 
permit a parent to recover the child's general damages in trust or 
in behalf of the child.) 
At common law, it was recognized that a father had a property 
interest in his childrens' services just as he had a property 
interest in the services of his servants or his wife.11 
Nevertheless, at least one state which has a statute similar to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended), has held that such a 
provision merely codifies the common law right of the parent to 
recover damages for the loss of services or earnings of the child 
and medical expenses incurred by a parent in the child's behalf. 
This jurisdiction also specifically held that such a statute will 
nSee "Negligent Injury to Family Relationships: A 
Reevaluation of the Logic of Liability,1' 77 NW. U.L. Rev. 794 
(1983). 
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not support a parent's action for loss of filial consortium.12 
Although there have been no Utah cases decided directly on point 
dealing with this issue, Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177, 
1178 (Utah 1971) appears to follow this rule when this Court held 
that a parent was entitled to recover for medical expenses expended 
in behalf of a nonfatally injured child and for earnings due the 
child under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended). General 
damages were confined to the pain and suffering of the minor child. 
At least one member of this Court has suggested that all 
actions for loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injuries fail 
to state a claim in Utah. Justice Howe opined that such damages 
are only proper if the legislature were to first make such a 
determination. In his concurring opinion, Justice Howe stated: 
I fully agree with majority that if the right to 
consortium [for nonfatal injuries] is to be given in this 
state, the proper approach should be for the legislature 
to do it by modifying the language of § 30-2-4. In doing 
so, the legislature can give the right to both husband 
and wife. It can also consider how far that right should 
be extended to others, such as children who likewise 
suffer when a parent is tortiously injured . . . . 
However admirable in the name of justice it is, to 
attempt to compensate everyone who suffers at the hand 
of the tort-feasor, boundaries must be drawn . . . the 
legislature is peculiarly equipped to draw the lines. 
We are not. 
Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1288-89. 
Other jurisdictions, although they may allow a parent to 
recover for loss of services of the child and medical expenses 
expended on the child's behalf, have refused to allow recovery of 
loss of consortium damages claimed by a parent for the loss of 
Beerbower v. State, 736 P.2d 596 (Or. App. 1987). 
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society and companionship with a child when the child has not been 
fatally injured. In fact, this is the clear majority position 
among those jurisdictions which have considered the issue.13 
Appellants in their Brief claim that both Illinois and New 
York recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. 
In fact, neither jurisdiction does.14 The Illinois Supreme Court 
in Dralle v. Ruder, supra, provides what is probably the most 
carefully reasoned opinion of any court which has considered the 
issue as to why loss of filial consortium damages for nonfatal 
injuries should not be permitted. 
In Dralle. the parents argued that because loss of filial 
consortium damages were permitted in wrongful death actions (as is 
the case in Utah), such damages should also be permitted in the 
Smith v. Richardson. 171 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1965); Baxter v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977); 
Cimino v. Yale University. 638 F. Supp. 952 (D.C. Conn. 1986); 
Dralle v. Ruder. 529 N.E.2d 209 (111. 1988); Deems v. Western Md. 
Rv. . 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967) (dictum) ; Butler v. Chrestman. 264 
So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Wilson v. Lockwood. 711 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. 
App. 1986); Siciliano v. Capital City Shows. Inc.. 475 A.2d 19 
(N.H. 1984); Brennan v. Biber. 225 A.2d 742 (N.J. App. 1966), aff'd 
239 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1968); Wilson v. Gait. 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. App. 
1983); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery. Inc.. 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 
155 (1946); Beyer v. Murray. 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970); Michigan 
Sanitarium and Benevolent Association v. Neal. 139 S.E. 841 (N.C. 
1927); Beerbower v. State. 736 P.2d 596 (Ore. App. 1987); Ouinn v. 
Pittsburgh. 90 A. 353 (Pa. 1914); McGarr v. National and Providence 
Worsted Mills. 53 A. 320 (R.I. 1902); and Gates v. Richardson. 719 
P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). In addition, at least one court has held 
that although it will allow loss of consortium by a parent with a 
nonfatally injured child, that the parents1 action for loss of the 
childfs consortium is limited to the childfs minority. See 
Shocklev v. Prier. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975). 
14Dralle v. Ruder. 529 N.E.2d 209 (111. 1988) (this case 
distinguishes Dvmek v. Nyguist. 128 111. App. 3d 359, 469 N.E.2d 
659 (1984) cited by appellants). See also Beyer v. Murray. 306 
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1970) and White v. City of New York. 322 N.Y.S.2d 
920 (1970), rejecting plaintiff's filial consortium claims. 
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case of nonfatally injured children. The Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected this argument noting that the distinction between a claim 
for loss of consortium in a wrongful death action and such a claim 
in a case involving a nonfatally injured child lies in the fact 
that the living victim retains his or her own cause of action 
against the tort-feasor. As the court stated: 
Thus, there is no danger that the injury caused by the 
tort-feasor will go uncompensated or that similar conduct 
in the future will be undeterred. 
Id. at 212. 
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court noted other 
considerations which convinced it not to extend to parents the 
right to recover filial consortium damages for nonfatal injuries 
to their children. These policy considerations are as follows: 
1. To recognize claims for loss of society resulting from 
nonfatal injuries to a child would threaten enlargement of 
liability. Grandparents, siblings and friends suffering similar 
losses of society and companionship would also seek to bring claims 
if recovery were to go unchecked.15 
2. Permitting both the injured victim and his parents to 
pursue their own actions would invite duplicate recoveries. In 
light of the intangible nature of loss of consortium, a trier of 
fact would find it difficult to distinguish between the child's 
claim, involving pain and suffering, and the legally distinct but 
'Dralle at 210. 
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factually similar claim by the parents for loss of a child's 
society and companionship.16 
3. In order to succeed in an action for loss of filial 
consortium, the parents of a nonfatally injured child would be 
required to present evidence of the diminution of their child's 
society and companionship resulting from the injury. This would 
entail the difficult task of assigning a monetary value to the 
reduced value of the parents' relationship with the injured child. 
At the same time, the defendant would attempt to show the strength 
of family bonds and greater appreciation for life arising from the 
child's injury. This parental interest in minimizing the value of 
the living child would contrast sharply with the situation in a 
wrongful death action, where the opposite claim is made and loss 
is presumed.17 
As the Illinois Supreme Court noted, 
The adoption of that rule [allowing recovery for loss of 
filial consortium] would thus engender the unseemly 
spectacle of parents disparaging the "value" of their 
children or the degree of their affection for them in 
open court. 
Id. at 213. 
In addition, because Utah law does not permit damages for the 
loss of spousal consortium for nonfatal injuries which includes, 
in addition to service, elements of companionship, felicity and 
sexual intercourse, if this Court were to permit such damages, it 
would be placing greater value on the right of association and 
16Dralle at 210. 
17Dralle at 213. 
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companionship between a parent and a child than between two 
spouses. In addition, a child is far more dependent upon a parent 
than a parent upon a child, yet if an action for filial consortium 
damages were to be recognized, this would place more value on 
parental association with the child, than the child's association 
with the parent. 
Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. 1985) is among those cases 
cited by Appellants which they claim support a recovery of filial 
consortium damages. In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court based 
its holding in favor of allowing filial consortium damages on the 
grounds (1) that loss of spousal consortium damages were 
recoverable in situations of nonfatal injury to a spouse and should 
not be denied to the parents of nonfatally injured children, and 
(2) that the expansion of liability was within the realm of the 
judicial, rather than the legislative branch of government. 
Neither of these arguments are available under Utah law. This 
Court has repeatedly denied claims for spousal consortium and 
Justice Howe has opined that the consortium issue is best left to 
the legislature to decide. 
In summary, because plaintiff Daniel Boucher is not a minor, 
Utah Code Ann. 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) has no application to his 
parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953, as amended) and Utah 
Const, art. XVI, § 5, both deal with wrongful death, and have no 
application to the claims of James and Torla Boucher. Even if the 
Court were to seriously consider permitting loss of filial 
consortium damages for nonfatal injuries, the concept is fraught 
with difficulties. As previously noted, (1) common law allowed 
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parents to recover only for loss of services and medical expenses 
expended on behalf of a child. This is the most that Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953, as amended) accomplishes; (2) permitting 
filial consortium damages would constitute an invasion of the 
legislative prerogative; (3) since Utah does not permit a spouse 
to recover loss of consortium damages for his or her nonfatally 
injured mate and does not permit a child to recover such damages 
for his or her nonfatally injured parent, permitting damages for 
loss of filial consortium would have the anomalous effect of 
putting a higher value on a parent's association with a child than 
a spouse's association with his or her mate or than a child's 
association with a parent; (4) permitting filial consortium damages 
would justify expansion of similar relief to grandparents, aunts, 
uncles and friends; (5) allowing filial consortium damages would 
create the danger of double recoveries or confusing damage awards 
because of the confusion of the trier of fact between the pain and 
suffering of the injured child and the parental claim of loss of 
filial consortium; (6) finally, allowing loss of filial consortium 
damages would require parents to denigrate or reduce the value of 
the parent-child relationship in order to maximize recovery whereas 
in wrongful death actions parents attempt to establish the value 
of that relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the District Court's Order 
of Dismissal of plaintiff's causes of action for (1) negligent 
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infliction of emotional distress; and (2) loss of filial consortium 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this jf/j day of February, 1991. 
^ SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ii^ rry R. Laycock 
Attorneys for D e f e n d a n t / 
Respondent David W. Moore, M.D. 
KIRTON, ftcCONKIE & POELMAN 
By 
Les W. Dahlquist, i: Cha* 
Larry R. White 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents IHC, Inc., et al 
35\1rl\10224.616\boucher.sct 
a:\boucher.rct 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Ch. 12 STANDARD OF CONDUCT § 3 J 3 
§ 3 1 3 . Emotional Distress Unintended 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional dis-
tress to another, he is subject to liability to the other 
for resulting illness or bodily harm ff) the actor 
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved 
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise 
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third per-
son, and 
(b) from facts known to him should have realized 
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in ill-
ness or bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no appli-
cation to illness or bodily harm of another which is 
caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or 
peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the 
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodi-
ly harm to the other. 
See Reporter's Notes* 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
a. The rule stated in this Section does not give protec-
tion to mental and emotional tranquillity in itself. In general?} 
as stated in § 436 A, there is no liability where the actor's negli-j 
gent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting 
bodily harm or any other invasion of the other's interests^ Such 
emotional distress is importantfcgnly in so far as its existence 
involves a risk of bodily harm, and as aifecting the damages 
recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. See § 903. 
6. The rule stated in this Section is unnecessary to make 
the actor's conduct negligent and, therefore, to subject him to 
liability if the actor should realize that it involves an unreason-
able risk of causing bodily harm in some other manner, such 
as by immediate impact. As to the effect which is to be given 
to the fact that the act negligent because otherwise threatening 
bodily harm results in the harm solely through the effect of the 
actor's conduct upon the mind or emotions of the other, see 
§436. 
c. The rule stated in this Section which determines the 
liability of a person who negligently subjects another to emo-
tional distress likely to cause physical consequences differs from 
the rule stated in §312, which determines the liability of one 
See Appendix for Reporter's Hotes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
U Beautement of Torts 2d]—8 H 3 
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who intentionally subjects another thereto in one particular. 
As is stated in Comment d under § 312, the actor who inten-
tionally subjects another to emotional distress may under some 
circumstances take the risk that the other may, unknown to him, 
have a resistance to emotional strain which is less than that of the 
ordinary man although characteristic of a recognized minority 
of human beings. On the other hand, one who unintentionally 
but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress 
does not take the risk of any exceptional physical sensitive-
ness to emotion which the other may have unless the circum-
stances known to the actor should apprise him of it. Thus, 
one who negligently drives an automobile through a city street 
in a manner likely merely to startle a pedestrian on a side-
walk, is not required to take into account the possibility that 
the latter may be so constituted that the slight mental disurbance 
will bring about an illness. 
Illustrations: 
1. A is employed to drive B to a hospital. He is 
informed that B is desperately ill. Nonetheless, he drives 
at a rapid rate of speed and cuts in and out of traffic. He 
thereby puts B in such fear of a collision that B suffers a 
serious increase in her illness, A is subject to liability 
toB. 
2. Under the facts assumed in Illustration 1, A would 
not be liable to B if he had no reason to know of B's ill-
ness. 
Comment on Subsection (2): 
d. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where 
the negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with emo-
tional distress likely to result in bodily harm because of the 
other's fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out 
of fear for his own safety, or the invasion of his own inter-
ests. It has no application where the emotional distress arises 
solely because of harm or peril to a third person, and the negli-
gence of the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily 
harm in any other way. 
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a 
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, 
witnesses the event and suffers severe emotional distress re-
sulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to her, she cannot 
fte« Appendix for Boportor'i Notoi, Court Citation*, and Crou Boftronces 
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Ch. 12 STANDARD OF CONDUCT 
recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path 
of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with 
bodily harm to herself otherwise than through the emotional 
distress at the peril to her child. 
As to the rule to be applied where the other is so threatened 
with bodily harm in another manner, and instead suffers emo-
tional distress at the peril or harm of a third person, which re-
sults in bodily harm to the other, see § 436. 
TOPIC 7. DUTIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Scope Note: The duties to take positive action imposed by 
common law are generally duties to act with reasonable care in 
order to give to others the aid or protection which the perform-
ance of the duty would afford them. The words "reasonable 
care" are here used to denote that the actor is required to do that 
which a reasonable man would believe to be necessary to afford 
the aid or protection to which the other is entitled, but no more. 
There are many cases, however, in which the actor deliber-
ately fails to perform a duty which he knows is vital to the secu-
rity of another. In such case, his misconduct is often either 
intentional, that is, done for the very purpose of harming the 
other or with knowledge that harm will certainly result from it 
(see § 8 A), or is in reckless disregard of the other's interests 
(see §500). 
This Topic deals with only a part of the situations in which 
there is a duty of protective action. The duty of maintaining 
land and structures thereon in safe condition which is imposed 
upon the possessor and lessor by virtue of their possession or 
of a covenant to repair is stated in §§328E-379, which deal 
with the liability of possessors and lessors of land. The duty 
of careful custody which is imposed upon possessors and cus-
todians of animate and other chattels likely to escape from the 
place where they are put unless carefully guarded is stated in 
Volume 3. The duties of inspection and disclosure of the defec-
tive condition of chattels which are imposed upon those who 
use, dispose, or otherwise deal with chattels are stated in §§ 388-
408. As to the duties which are imposed by legislative enact-
ment, see §§ 286-288 C. The duty to continue services gratui-
tously rendered or to perform a gratuitous undertaking and the 
duty so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them 
from causing bodily harm to others are stated in this Topic. 
M— Appendix for Shorter*! Votes, Court Citations, and Cross Sstsrsaoos 
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ADDENDUM "B 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II - A0798 
Larry R. White - #3446 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELM&N 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
Dixie Medical Center, 
Edward Foxley, M.D. and 
Kathy Marshall, R*N. 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through 
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER, 
TORLA BOUCHER, an individual, 
and JAMES BOUCHER, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, a 
division of IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., EDWARD FOXLEY, M.D., 
DAVID MOORE, M.D,, 
KATHY MARSHALL, R.N., and 
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 90-3108 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Dixie Medical 
Center, a division of IHC Hospitals, Inc., Edward Foxley, M.D., and 
Kathy Marshall, R.N., and the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of 
David Moore, M.D., came on for argument before the Honorable J. 
B-l 
J&2 
Philip Eves pursuant to notice on May 4, 1990. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Irwin Zalkin. Defendants, Dixie Medical Center, 
Foxley and Marshall were represented by Charles W. Dahlquist, II, 
and the defendant Moore was represented by Larry R. Laycock. 
The Court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the 
parties, having heard oral argument and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The motions to dismiss of the defendants are granted. 
2* Torla Boucher and James Boucher are dismissed as 
individual parties to this action as to all causes of action 
contained in the Complaint filed by plaintiffs for the reason they 
have failed to state a claim or cause of action upon which relief 
can be granted. More particularly, they have not stated a claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium 
with their child, hedonic damage, or any other cognizable cause of 
action. 
3. The Second and Third Causes of Action contained in 
plaintiffs' Complaint are dismissed for the reason they fail to 
state a claim or cause of action upon which relief may be granted 
independent of the First Cause of Action* 
B-2 
-2-
rt-tf £M ?^1 ±H'Z>V 
4. The defendants Dixie Medical Center, Bdvard Foxley, 
M.D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N*, are granted twenty (20) days from 
the date of entry of this grder to answer plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
DATED this _ 
BY THE COURT: 
L U I S UJ.US.L L U CUiSWCJ. p i < 
2$ day of May, 1990. 
£jg ^ ^ ^ J* Phi l ip Eves 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /^r ^ ~day of May, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
Hatch, Morton & Skeen 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Irwin M. Zalkin 
1145 Tenth Avenue 
San Diego, California 92101 
Attorneys for Defendant Moore 
David W. Slagle 
Larry R. Laycock 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
^L^J^y^f. (L%U/,J> J 
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ATiriENHUM " C " 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN #2693 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL BOUCHER, by and through 
his guardian, TORLA BOUCHER, 
TORLA BOUCHER, an individual and ] 
JAMES BOUCHER, an individual ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, a ! 
division of IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
EDWARD FOXLEY, M.D., ] 
DAVID MOORE, M.D., ] 
KATHY MARSHALL, R.N. and ] 
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
CERTIFICATION UNDER 
RULE 54(b) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
I PROCEDURE 
1 L ± v x o . iiw • -^  v !s~ .J .*. w O 
I Judge IlilJ i.p J . Lives 
The Motions ** : ismiss filed defendants Dixie Medical 
C ' ' - : u Foxley, M.D., 
and r'.dL./ . .rsna . ^ ; .:smiss :.*a- . :i 
behalf ct -x" -I Moore, M. argument before the 
l 
Plaint „ : : - - 'epresenteu . iwu.
 t>. . K . :, ^e;,endanls , Dixie 
Medical Center, Foxley ^*~ Marshall were represented ^u Charles 
W. Dahlquist, II, and the Defendant Moore was represented by 
Larry R. Laycock. 
The Court having reviewed the memorandum filed by the 
parties, having heard oral argument and being fully advised in 
the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The Motions to Dismiss of the Defendants are granted. 
2. Torla Boucher and James Boucher are dismissed as 
individual parties to this action as to all causes of action 
contained in the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs for the reason 
they have failed to state a claim or cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. More particularly, they have not stated a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of 
consortium with their child, hedonic damage, or any other 
cognizable cause of action. 
3. The Second and Third Causes of Action contained in 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint are dismissed for the reason they fail to 
state a claim or cause of action upon which relief may be granted 
independent of the First Cause of Action. 
4. The Defendants Dixie Medical Center, Edward Foxley, 
M..D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N., are granted twenty (20) days 
from the date of entry of this Order to answer Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
2 
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A r!:. " judgment — J— Tcrla Pcur,v*~~ and James Boucher 
is nereir .\:r-^^ * - - - . * > c_ - -IPtermination by the court 
tha*- t..e; « 
The ar - t- :.r:e . • • trtams tx Tcrla Boucher and James 
B .-- --*r "5erti*.ed iui repeal unaer Rule 54(b) of the 
Uta.. Rules ol CiviJ Procedure. 
DATED this A-G — day of September, 199 0. 
BY THE COURT: 
OERTlKh'ATF 
The f o r e g o i n g C e r t i f i c a t i o n ~ e 4 / U N ^ ^ ^ TTtah 
R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e wan hand :*• ^v^ren - * n a v d w
 4 aq e -:t 
Snuw, C h r i s t e n s e n ft I l a r t j n<»<ju < - h 
F l o o r , PO Box 4 5 000 , fia 11 La ke C i • ^ Utah '- ~ * 4 5 • - n a r l e s 
rn 11 i qu I r'+ „ ip' ,rt" c «T", McConk i P f- Poe" r~ - < c , - , Eas t S a l t 
Lake C i t y , Utah 84 11 I i ^ ~ ^ . : 
V/ >7<7 i^ a/^  ^.jtM^U a 
SECRETARY / ^ ' 
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DIAGNOSIS AND SUMMARY RECORD" 
TIONS/PROCEDURES 
CODE NO. 
LICATIONS/INFECT10N8 
TIFY THAT THE NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE pRtNCIPAL AND SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS Af ID "1 i IE H 1 • (OR 
EDURES PERFORMED ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST Of MY KNOWLEDGE " 
PATIENT NUMBER 
758214-1 
DATE 
M,D. 
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN SIGNATURE 
JL_J_ MEDICAL RECORDS NUMBE; 
OUCHER. DANIEL JAMES 
SS?vpEMR r l 
H 1 / 1 2 / 8 7 iSsfBOUCHER, DANIEL J 
0 BOX 856 MAAlTALo STATUS O REC. HOSPITAL SERVICE IN OTHE* HQSPtTAL WITHIN LAST BO DAYS 
V I N S , UT 84738 >°H B&S5.GREEN VALLEY 
SRCE 1TYPC »«*3 4 
AOORESS 
OF EMP L I F E GUARD 
1 6281477 cuo,K *°TJ19Y g£&0f 6 / 1 1 / 6 8 1 ™ EMPL. A PHONE STATUS Z INO. 
MOORE, DAVID M 37 £?U"*I0MEMAKER EMP. •/ OR DEPT 
STREET 
ADDRESS 
W* 9 - 3 5 - 3 1 4 5 "LOS LATTER DA NOTIFY CHURCH EMPt. PHONE STATUS [NO, 
BISHOP' 
PASTOR 
MOTHER 
i ? i i f f 2 9 - 5 4 - 5 3 36 
g^RIENQ lOUCHER, TORLA H 
'0 BOX 856 
BSffottRR. LARRY BROWN 
ADORESJBOX 386 
VINS. UT 84738 NS01 6281477 
FATHER 
Wn IVINS. UT 8 4 7 3 8 I8Q1 62S54 
I0UCHER. JAMES ALLEN SELF 
NUMBER/ 
DEPT 
'0 BOX 856 NB01 6 2 8 1 4 7 7 STREET ADORESS DRYWALL CONTR 
:VINS, UT 84738 20*530-62-3509 Wn EUPA. - PHONE STATUS 1 I MO. « |P  
BLAST INJURY R HAND rcZ&BLAST INJURY R HAND 60187 22; 
^oc^ANDMAOE BOMB BLAST 
'AMBULANCE 2X500 
Ub0187 MIC 
Sg&AIAN 0 WAR BRIDGE p i I T T ^ r ^ ^ . 
CUMIE* 
TIT AH l 
'RIVATE PAV-FOLLOW UP 
COD«05 0 6 0 1 8 7 05 060 
=TJ020 2&co,*N0NE 
STREET' 
ADORESS 
W: 
i: 
)NDITION 
ON 
SCHARGEREf^VEflED 
PAT. RELA 1 
TO S U 8 5 ^ * 
CONTRACT 
Nuuae* 
GROUP 
NUMBER 
IMPROVED a IMPROVED 
svsooooo 
PRIOR 
AUTN. 
GROUP 
WITH 
POLICY 
HOLDER 
MAIL 
CLAIM TO: 
1 1 TRbAitu L-J EXPIRED • 
|TO sufit) 1 CONTRACT NUMBER 
GROUP 
NUMBER 
RELEASED (—| 
AGAINST ADVISE L J 
sisfeooo 
AUTOPSY D 
MEDICAL RECORDS 
A D D F ; N I H I M " K " 
CM "\° 
,3l 
Th as Rasmussen, Esq. 2^3 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
At- .rney for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickvard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake C;.:v, Utah 94106 
Telephone: »S01) 484-3000 
N^y ^  m^nuaL 
?s 
Q 0 
w IN THE DISTRIC 
I 
; ";••::: *.-.: JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
I^AAC UUUINII, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL BOUCHER", by and through 
his Guardian, TORLA BOUCHER,v 
TORLA BOUCHER, an Individual, 
JAMES BOUCHER, an Individua] , 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
IHC INC., doing business 
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER, EDWA.. 
FOXLEY, M.F* 
KATHY MARSH; 
throuo^ 
DAVID MOORE, 
P . NT -i r A 
L L O 
r , D , 
COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE 
IN THE PROVISION OF HEALTH 
CARE; MEDICAL MALPR ACTICE 
<r i II III 
j u d g e : 
• M o i D i ^ /,.| pp. 
JUWS TIMOTHY R. HAKSW 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, Daniel Boucher, by and through his 
Guardian, Torla Boucher, Torla Boucher, an individual, and James 
Boucher, an individual, and allege the following against 
defendants IHC Inc., doing business as Dixie Medical Center, 
Edward Foxley, M.D., David Moore, M.D., and Kathy Marshall, R.N., 
and Does 1 through 20, inclusive and each of them as follows: 
I 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENCE IN THE PROVISION 
OF HEALTH CARE; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE) 
1. Due to the incompetence as a result of the mental 
disability suffered by plaintiff Daniel Boucher, TORLA BOUCHER 
was appointed the legal Guardian of plaintiff DANIEL BOUCHER. 
2. Plaintiff has complied with the Utah Statutory 
Requirements (78-14-12 U.C.A.) of obtaining a pre-litigation 
review of the this matter prior to filing this complaint. 
3. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names of defendants 
Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore sues the defendants 
by such fictitious names; when their true names and capacities 
have been ascertained by plaintiff, plaintiff will move the court 
for leave to amend this complaint to set forth their true names 
and capacities; plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that each of the fictitiously named defendants was in 
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some manner liable for negligence and other wrongful conduct 
alleged herein, and for the damages resulting therefrom. 
4. At all times herein mentioned each of the defendants 
named herein was the agent, servant, and employee of each 
remaining defendant and all of them or in the alternative, was 
engaged in a general partnership with each remaining .defendant, 
and all of them, or in the alternative, was a joint venturer with 
each remaining defendant, in doing the acts herein alleged was 
acting within the course and scope of, and for the benefit of 
said principal, partnership, employer or joint venturer, and was 
acting with the full consent and radification of each principal, 
partner, employer or joint venturer mentioned herein. 
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon 
alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, defendant, IHC INC., 
(hereinafter IHC), is a corporation licensed to do business in, 
and in accordance with, the law of the State of Utah and is doing 
business as Dixie Medical Center, (hereinafter Dixie) within and 
according to the State of Utah or in the alternative is a 
business enterprise the form of which is unknown. 
6. Defendant Dixie is a part of and or a participant in 
the IHC Group Health Plan and is operated according to the 
provisions and or under the direction of IHC and is a licensed 
hospital facility operating for the benefit of the public 
including the plaintiff herein. 
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7. Defendants Edward Foxley, M.D., (hereinafter Foxley), 
David Moore, M.D., (hereinafter Moore) and Kathy Marshall, R.N., 
(hereinafter Marshall), were at the time of the alleged incident 
residing in Washington County, Utah. 
8. At the time of the alleged incident herein defendants 
Foxley, Moore and Marshall, and each of them were employed by or 
in the alternative obtained staff priveleges from defendant 
Dixie• 
9. At all times herein mentioned plaintiff Daniel 
Boucher, (hereinafter Boucher), was a resident of Washington 
County Utah. 
10. The plaintiff has been informed and believes, and 
upon such information and belief, alleges that defendant Dixie is 
authorized and licensed to conduct and did conduct, operate, 
manage and control a hospital (a general or community hospital) 
in St. George, Utah, known as Dixie Medical Center, to which 
members of the general public, including the plaintiff herein 
were invited as patients. 
11. At the time of the alleged incident herein and at the 
time of the filing of this lawsuit, defendant Dixie was and is a 
hospital licensed to do business in the City of St. George, Utah, 
and operates pursuant to the provisions or direction of defendant 
IHC a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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12. On or about June 3, 1987, the time of the alleged 
incident herein, the defendants Foxley, Moore and Marshall, and 
each of them were physicians and surgeons or nurses licensed by 
the State of Utah in medicine and surgery or nursing care in said 
State and all of whom were engaged in a patient physician/nursing 
relationship with plaintiff Boucher on or about the 
aforementioned date. 
13. At all times relevant to the allegations herein, the 
defendants Foxley, Moore and Marshall, and Does 1 through 20, 
held themselves out to possess and exercise that degree of skill 
learning ability and expertise possessed and exercised by similar 
medical practioners and nurses in the County of Washington and 
the State of Utah. 
14. On June 1, 1987, plaintiff Boucher sustained an 
injury to the right hand for which defendant Moore performed 
surgical repair at defendant Dixie hospital on the morning of 
June 2, 1987. The surgery was uneventfull and the results 
unremarkable. During the course of the post-operative recovery 
period plaintiff Boucher received infusions of Morphine in excess 
of 100 mg. in addition to Versed, Valium, and Fentanyl which 
caused plaintiff to become heavily sedated. Immediately after 
midnight of June 2, 1987, in the early a.m. hours of June 3, 
1987, plaintiff Boucher was noted to be experiencing stertorus 
breathing and by 4:20 a.m. was unarouseable. 
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15. Prior to obtaining patient plaintiff Boucher's 
consent to perform hand surgery, defendant Moore failed to warn 
plaintiff of any risks inherent in or attendant to post-operative 
recovery and or the infusion of Morphine alone or in combination 
with Versed, Valium and Fentanyl. 
16. At all times mentioned herein the defendants IHC by 
and through their agents and or employees and each and everyone 
of the remaining defendants, Dixie, Foxley, Moore and Marshall, 
Does 1 through 20, and each of them, failed to properly monitor 
the patient, plaintiff Boucher, and furthermore failed to take 
timely and appropriate remedial action when the patient 
plaintiff, was first observed to be experiencing respiratory 
difficulties. The patient was observed at 4:20 a.m. to be 
suffering from the effects of severe hypoxia which subsequently 
led to severe brain damage and spastic quadraplegia. 
17. At all times mentioned herein, the defendants IHC by 
and through their agents and or employees and each and everyone 
of the remaining defendants, Dixie, Foxley, Moore and Marshall, 
Does 1 through 20, and each of them, failed to timely call for 
the assistance of a physician and when called defendant Moore did 
not respond in a timely or appropriate manner and further 
defendant Foxley refused to respond and as such defendants Moore 
and Foxley failed to timely perform procedures which may have 
served to decrease the brain damage and extent of spasticity 
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suffered by the plaintiff. 
18. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each of 
them the plaintiff patient was rendered in a comatose state for a 
period of approximately ten (10) days and upon his emergence 
therefrom he discovered that he had sustained visual and speech 
impairments, memory loss, loss of knowledge, decreased learning 
ability, lack of ability to recognize family members or friends, 
that he was incontinent of bowel and bladder, that he was unable 
to voluntarily move any of his extremeties in that he was 
imprisoned by the confines of his own body, the discovery of 
which all led to his suffering severe emotional distress, fright, 
anxiety, and mental suffering. 
19. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid 
negligence of the defendants and each of them in failing to 
properly monitor and take timely emergency action the plaintiff, 
Boucher, suffered severe hypoxia and as a result of that oxygen 
deprivation became brain damaged and a quadraplegic. 
20. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each of 
them the plaintiff has incurred hospital and medical expenses, 
requires extraordinary care-taking, living expenses, 
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rehabilitation expenses and in addition will need future life 
time care and supervision rehabilitation, and medical care, in 
an amount exceeding One Hundred Thousand Dollars, ($100,000.00). 
21. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each of 
them the plaintiff has sustained loss of memory, loss of 
communicative skills, diminished visual capacity, a loss of 
previously acquired knowledge and skills, and a loss of 45 IQ 
points to the below normal range. 
22. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each of 
them the plaintiff has suffered economic and wage loss and has 
suffered injury to his earning capacity which is permanent and in 
an amount which has not yet been completely ascertained but in 
excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars, ($100,000.00). 
23. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants and each of 
them plaintiff has suffered severe emotional and mental distress 
and loss of enjoyment of his life pursuits. 
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II 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) 
For a separate and distinct Cause of Action against the 
defendants and each of them plaintiffs Torla and Boucher 
incorporate by reference herein in full paragraphs 1 through 23 
of the First Cause of Action and further allege: 
24. At all times mentioned herein the defendants IHC by 
and through their agents and or employees each and every of the 
remaining defendants, Dixie, Foxley, Moore and Marshall, Does 1 
through 20, and each of them, knew or should have known that 
their failure to perform according to the standards of their 
profession as defined by their community, as herein-above 
alleged, would result in severe emotional distress and suffering 
to the parents of Daniel Boucher, Torla Boucher and James 
Boucher. 
25. As a proximate result of the negligence of defendants 
and Does 1 through 20, and each of them, plaintiffs Torla Boucher 
and James Boucher have suffered severe emotional and mental 
distress, and have lost the comfort, protection, and society of 
their son. The amount of said damages are unknown at this time. 
Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this complaint according to 
proof. 
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Ill 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENT IMPAIRMENT OF QUALITY OF LIFE) 
HEDONIC DAMAGES 
For a separate and distinct Cause of Action against the 
defendants and each of them plaintiff Boucher realleges each and 
every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 22 of the 
First Cause of Action. 
26. At the time of admission of patient plaintiff Boucher 
to defendant Dixie's hospital, Boucher was enlisted in the Utah 
Army, National Guard and his goal was to transfer to the Air 
Force and become a pilot. He had been working as a stock clerk 
and previously employed as a life guard. He was a good to above 
average student who participated in drama and other school 
activities in addition to recreational sports such as skiing, 
swimming, football and baseball and socially interacted with 
numerous male and female friends. 
27. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
aforementioned negligence and breach of the professional standard 
of care (professional malpractice) of the defendants, and each of 
them, the plaintiff Boucher has suffered an impaired quality of 
life in that he can no longer learn and acquire knowledge to the 
extent his previous IQ of 130 points would have allowed him; is 
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no longer able to communicate or interact in a social manner at 
the level he was once able to conduct himself; he has no career 
potential nor has he the ability to acquire any employable 
economic skills. The appropriate amount of damages for this 
cause of action have not yet been ascertained. Plaintiffs will 
seek leave to amend according to proof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Daniel Boucher respectfully prays for 
judgment against the defendants IHC, Dixie, Foxley, Moore and 
Marshall, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and each of them, for 
all Causes of Action, as follows: 
1. For General Damages according to proof at trial; 
2. For Special Damages according to proof at trial; 
3. For costs of suit incurred herein; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the court may 
deem just and proper. 
DATED: dcr-pa**. zT Mai 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
THOMAS RASMUSSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
DANIEL BOUCHER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
We do hereby certify that on the 4th day of February, 1991, 
we caused four (4) true and correct copies of the Brief of 
Respondents IHC Hospitals d/b/a Dixie Medical Center and David 
Moore, M.D., to be served upon the following: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, Jr., Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Erwin M. Zalkin, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1145 Tenth Avenue 
San Diego, California 92101 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
L^rry R. L^ypocK 
KIRTON, ^ McCONKIE & POELMAN 
By 
35\lrl\10224.616\coa.sct 
